How the xz backdoor highlights a major flaw in Nix | Shade's Blog
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Background On Friday, March 29th, 2024, a historical and sophisticated security vulnerability (CVE-2024-3094) was discovered in the XZ Utils package and liblzma api in version 5.6.0 and 5.6.1. While this vulnerability mostly affects Debian and RedHat distributions, there was some interesting discussion regarding xz and Nix. How did this affect Nix and NixOS? The truth is not a whole lot in reality. I saw conflicting reports, but supposedly, the tarballs of xz that Nix downloads were not infected.

The main issue is the handling of security updates within the Nixpkgs ecosystem, which relies on Nix’s CI system, Hydra, to test and build packages. Due to the extensive number of packages in the Nixpkgs repository, the process can be slow, causing delays in the release of updates. As an example, the updated xz 5.4.6 package took nearly 5 days to become available in the unstable branch!

Fundamentally, there needs to be a change in how security fixes are handled in Hydra. As stated in the article, Nix was lucky to be unaffected, but multiple days to push out a security patch of this severity is concerning, even if there was no reason for concern.

  • Arthur Besse@lemmy.mlMEnglish
    61·
    7 months ago

    As of today, NixOS (like most distros) has reverted to a version slightly prior to the release with the Debian-or-Redhat-specific sshd backdoor which was inserted into xz just two months ago. However, the saboteur had hundreds of commits prior to the insertion of that backdoor, and it is very likely that some of those contain subtle intentional vulnerabilities (aka “bugdoors”) which have not yet been discovered.

    As (retired) Debian developer Joey Hess explains here, the safest course is probably to switch to something based on the last version (5.3.1) released prior to Jia Tan getting push access.

    Unfortunately, as explained in this debian issue, that is not entirely trivial because dependents of many recent pre-backdoor potentially-sabotaged versions require symbol(s) which are not present in older versions and also because those older versions contain at least two known vulnerabilities which were fixed during the multi-year period where the saboteur was contributing.

    After reading Xz format inadequate for long-term archiving (first published eight years ago…) I’m convinced that migrating the many projects which use XZ today (including DPKG, RPM, and Linux itself) to an entirely different compression format is probably the best long-term plan. (Though we’ll always still need tools to read XZ archives for historical purposes…)