If by “asiatic Russians” they mean Buryats, then it’s not a racist connection, they are actually Mongols that fell north of Russia-China border at some point. Then the Chinese part (much of it) became independent Mongolia. Buryats are mostly Oirat-Mongols, while Mongolia is mostly Khalkha-Mongols, but the primary difference is how the border was drawn.

About meat wave attacks - in WWI everyone did that normally (“… the 8th wave will shake the enemy, but be exterminated before reaching them, the 9th, 10th and 11th waves will reach the position and be repelled, so will the 12th, and the 13th wave takes the position, this is the plan of attack for 0600 tomorrow morning, gentlemen, any questions?”), so the supposed difference between Russia and others would be in the last 100 years. WWII was hard and everyone did human waves, but a bit less than in WWI. Most of the stereotype is connected to WWII. After WWII Russia had Afghanistan, where Soviet military unofficially learned a few things about modern warfare, and people who went through it were apparently often very competent, but didn’t change the formalized doctrines and military education in ex-Soviet countries - the times were hard, and that experience went in vain. Then it had Chechen wars, which, well, were fought by idiotic butcher generals without Afghanistan command experience against Chechens some of whose leaders had it. Similar to why Armenians had some successes in the first Karabakh war - Azerbaijani commanders were clueless butchers without experience, and Armenian field commanders went through Afghanistan. So - Chechnya is basically the same approach with which Russia started in 2022. Ruin everything with artillery, then send in columns of clueless expendable troops. Except they didn’t ruin everything and the reality kicked in.

In rough strokes that’s similar to Soviet doctrine immediately after WWII, intended for a literal world war, where quality of troops matters less than ability to quickly form, mobilize and move them. Ruin large swathes of territory with nukes, move troops quickly through irradiated terrain to take control of it, remaining holdouts in the points of control ruin with artillery and send troops specifically there. In that context it even makes sense - a different order of scale matters most. And other contexts were not interesting for the USSR after WWII, even Stalin didn’t intend to fight wars other than that imagined apocalypse war, limited police actions and interventions at most. And Soviet leaders after Stalin, despite being fools by various criteria, didn’t dream of playing Caesar, they had seen a war and they didn’t want more.

It was a time fascinating in some sense, where even authoritarian leaders with various inferiority complexes didn’t even think of compensating those through war. Khruschev once or twice pressed for a death sentence for “economic crimes” (basically black market trade) which would mean a short prison sentence, because he was offended by the fact that in his socialist piece of land someone would want to live differently. Brezhnev wanted to have good relations with everyone and also compliments and rewards. Andropov might have been an intelligent person when a bit younger, but in his time as general secretary simply lacked energy to fix anything to save the USSR, because he’d have to fight his friends of similar age with similarly fossilized brains.

Returning to the simple “ruin everything with grads, then send in columns of clueless meat on trucks, augmented with some tanks here and there” scheme, Ukraine did that too, in its attempts at a counteroffensive. Ex-Soviet generals just don’t know anything else. Nobody apparently did a comprehensive revision of doctrines, attestation and retraining of the command staff and frankly all serving officers, those things. Or maybe incompetent officers just default to this.