This is an unpopular opinion, and I get why – people crave a scapegoat. CrowdStrike undeniably pushed a faulty update demanding a low-level fix (booting into recovery). However, this incident lays bare the fragility of corporate IT, particularly for companies entrusted with vast amounts of sensitive personal information.
Robust disaster recovery plans, including automated processes to remotely reboot and remediate thousands of machines, aren’t revolutionary. They’re basic hygiene, especially when considering the potential consequences of a breach. Yet, this incident highlights a systemic failure across many organizations. While CrowdStrike erred, the real culprit is a culture of shortcuts and misplaced priorities within corporate IT.
Too often, companies throw millions at vendor contracts, lured by flashy promises and neglecting the due diligence necessary to ensure those solutions truly fit their needs. This is exacerbated by a corporate culture where CEOs, vice presidents, and managers are often more easily swayed by vendor kickbacks, gifts, and lavish trips than by investing in innovative ideas with measurable outcomes.
This misguided approach not only results in bloated IT budgets but also leaves companies vulnerable to precisely the kind of disruptions caused by the CrowdStrike incident. When decision-makers prioritize personal gain over the long-term health and security of their IT infrastructure, it’s ultimately the customers and their data that suffer.
Imaging environment down? If a sysadmin can’t figure out how to boot a machine into recovery to remove the bad update file then they have bigger problems. The fix in this instance wasn’t even re-imaging machines. It was merely removing a file. Ideal DR scenario would have a recovery image already on the system that can be booted into remotely, so there is minimal strain on the network. Furthermore, we don’t live in dial-up age anymore.
Imaging environment would be bitlocker’d with its key stuck in AD which is also bitlocker’d.
Only if you’re not practicing 3-2-1 with your backups.
Backup environment is also bitlocker’d.
Then you didn’t 3-2-1, because you should be able to restore from your alternate format, e.g. tape, without your existing infrastructure. Ideally your second and offsite copies are also offline, so even if you ignored the separate media rule, it wouldn’t have been affected by the crowdstrike update.
Ultimately, nobody should have to tell you not to lock your keys in the car.