Dmitri (@wartranslated)
canada.unofficialbird.com
Prigozhin says again that Rusian lines in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson are falling, and it is only a matter of time until moves similar to Kherson and Kharkiv regroupings take place. Local Russian commanders are forced to provide false reports on their positions so as to not antagonise the high command.

Dmitri of @wartranslated has proven a reliable translator, and Prigozhin — for all that he’s a war criminal who we may hope will one day decorate The Hague — has often proven to be more reliably in touch with tactical realities than his counterparts in the VSRF command structure or Russian media.

A necessary caveat here is that underlying Prigozhin’s communications is his own political game, IE discrediting the VSRF & Shoigu et al to gain more influence himself, but that doesn’t mean he’s incorrect in his assessment here.

  • dragontamer@lemmy.worldEnglish
    1·
    2 years ago

    I really want to know what this dude’s game is.

    I can’t imagine that he’s friends with… anybody… anywhere. So what’s up? Why is he doing this at all? Does he just plan to make a little fiefdom with Wagner troops alone somewhere?

    • Epilektoi_HoplitaiOPEnglish
      1·
      2 years ago

      I doubt anyone who isn’t privy to confidential intelligence briefings can say with any certainty, but we can speculate.

      In terms of friends — Prigozhin is one of the leaders of the pro-war militant faction; the ones who argue the war isn’t being fought with enough intensity or seriousness. Girkin is another one, who in fact criticises the former for trying to steal the base of support for his own “Angry Patriots Club”, ie the Russians who see how the incompetence of the military and political establishment is denying them victory.

      I’d say both of them are likely to some extent a controlled opposition, with friends in power who shield them to some extent from official retribution while allowing them to speak uncomfortable truths about military and political realities while (at least ostensibly) not threatening the regime itself. But the suspicion, of course, is that players in the elite are making contingency plans for the potential collapse of the regime — in which case Prigozhin’s private army would be a useful asset for a backer (or even Prigozhin himself) making a bid for power.

      He’s not the only one with a private army, incidentally, as there are now more and more being organised. The state owned energy company Gazprom has its own PMC; so does the national space agency Roscosmos. All of them useful assets in a potential power struggle.