I suppose to me, one’s moral weight is in their mind. If someone has no mind – such as a brain-dead patient – then they aren’t really a person. Seeing as there’s no reason to believe there’s an immediate jump in neural development in a baby at the moment of birth, I do not believe it’s a special moment for the baby in a moral accounting sense. So I don’t think the baby becomes more intrinsically worthy of life at the precise moment it draws its first breath.
(For the parent, of course, it is a special moment, and in particular new options are available outside of the keep-or-abort dichotomy.)
As for being an individual, I don’t really see how the child’s autonomy is relevant. It’s still fully dependent on its parents and society and could not function on its own regardless, so this is a fairly arbitrary step on the road to autonomy.
I suppose to me, one’s moral weight is in their mind.
The problem that i see with that is the following: Assume a child has little neural activity (which, btw, is not true at all; children and newborns often have higher neural activity than grown-ups), but assume for a moment that a child had little neural activity, and therefore would be less worthy of preservation.
Now, somebody who has migraine, or has repeated electrical shocks in their brain, might be in a lot of pain, but has probably more neural activity than you. Would you now consider that since they have more neural activity, they are more worthy of life than you are? And what if you and that other person would be bound to the tracks of a trolley problem? Wouldn’t it then be the ethical thing to kill you because you have less neural activity?
I don’t mean to say that neural activity ∝moral weight. I am merely asserting that something without neural activity at all (or similar construct) can’t be worth anything. This is why a rock has no moral value, and I don’t need to treat a rock nicely.
I am less confident – but still fairly confident – that consciousness, pain, and so on require at least a couple neurons – how many, I’m not sure – but creatures like tiny snails and worms probably aren’t worth consideration, or if they are then only very little. Shrimp are complex enough that I cannot say for sure that they aren’t equal in value to a human, but my intuition says they still don’t have fully-fledged sentience; I could be wrong though.
The strongest evidence that shrimp don’t have sentience is anthropic – if there are trillions of times more shrimp than humans, why am I a human and not a shrimp? Isn’t that astoundingly improbable? But anthropic arguments are questionable at best.
why am I a human and not a shrimp? Isn’t that astoundingly improbable?
haha yes i agree with that :D
my personal (kinda spiritual) take on this is that we are conscious because we are “nature’s soldiers” and we’re fighting the greater cause of life itself. That is what our consciousness is targeted at and what gives it justification in front of the world.
It’s dependent on a caretaker, but not necessarily on its own mother. Neural development also does take a big step starting at birth because the baby is now receiving stimuli.
If someone has no mind – such as a brain-dead patient – then they aren’t really a person.
Perhaps “not a person” isn’t the right way to put it. More like “already passed away.” I was being a bit provocative, sorry.
Regarding stimuli – fair enough, that is a good argument actually. But to me that indicates a “kink” in the graph of their moral worth; it ought to resemble a point where they start gaining moral worth, but not a point where they immediately have it.
Of course, this is all very speculative, vibes-based and handwavey. I don’t know how to define someone’s moral worth – which is precisely why I don’t see why birth is special to one’s moral worth.
Fair enough. I think you’re right to question these things; people have very strong opinions with hard lines here, but I don’t think there’s always solid reasoning for why some things that may seem like an obvious hard line are considered one.
Okay, to put it another way:
Once the child is born, it stops being literally a part of its mother and instead becomes an individual.
I suppose to me, one’s moral weight is in their mind. If someone has no mind – such as a brain-dead patient – then they aren’t really a person. Seeing as there’s no reason to believe there’s an immediate jump in neural development in a baby at the moment of birth, I do not believe it’s a special moment for the baby in a moral accounting sense. So I don’t think the baby becomes more intrinsically worthy of life at the precise moment it draws its first breath.
(For the parent, of course, it is a special moment, and in particular new options are available outside of the keep-or-abort dichotomy.)
As for being an individual, I don’t really see how the child’s autonomy is relevant. It’s still fully dependent on its parents and society and could not function on its own regardless, so this is a fairly arbitrary step on the road to autonomy.
The problem that i see with that is the following: Assume a child has little neural activity (which, btw, is not true at all; children and newborns often have higher neural activity than grown-ups), but assume for a moment that a child had little neural activity, and therefore would be less worthy of preservation.
Now, somebody who has migraine, or has repeated electrical shocks in their brain, might be in a lot of pain, but has probably more neural activity than you. Would you now consider that since they have more neural activity, they are more worthy of life than you are? And what if you and that other person would be bound to the tracks of a trolley problem? Wouldn’t it then be the ethical thing to kill you because you have less neural activity?
I don’t mean to say that neural activity ∝moral weight. I am merely asserting that something without neural activity at all (or similar construct) can’t be worth anything. This is why a rock has no moral value, and I don’t need to treat a rock nicely.
I am less confident – but still fairly confident – that consciousness, pain, and so on require at least a couple neurons – how many, I’m not sure – but creatures like tiny snails and worms probably aren’t worth consideration, or if they are then only very little. Shrimp are complex enough that I cannot say for sure that they aren’t equal in value to a human, but my intuition says they still don’t have fully-fledged sentience; I could be wrong though.
The strongest evidence that shrimp don’t have sentience is anthropic – if there are trillions of times more shrimp than humans, why am I a human and not a shrimp? Isn’t that astoundingly improbable? But anthropic arguments are questionable at best.
haha yes i agree with that :D
my personal (kinda spiritual) take on this is that we are conscious because we are “nature’s soldiers” and we’re fighting the greater cause of life itself. That is what our consciousness is targeted at and what gives it justification in front of the world.
I apologize, I just realized I got mixed up with a neighbouring debate regarding animal welfare lol. Thus the shrimp.
It’s dependent on a caretaker, but not necessarily on its own mother. Neural development also does take a big step starting at birth because the baby is now receiving stimuli.
This is gonna be a fun thread
Perhaps “not a person” isn’t the right way to put it. More like “already passed away.” I was being a bit provocative, sorry.
Regarding stimuli – fair enough, that is a good argument actually. But to me that indicates a “kink” in the graph of their moral worth; it ought to resemble a point where they start gaining moral worth, but not a point where they immediately have it.
Of course, this is all very speculative, vibes-based and handwavey. I don’t know how to define someone’s moral worth – which is precisely why I don’t see why birth is special to one’s moral worth.
Fair enough. I think you’re right to question these things; people have very strong opinions with hard lines here, but I don’t think there’s always solid reasoning for why some things that may seem like an obvious hard line are considered one.