It is difficult not to sympathize with Zelensky's desperation in a war that is indeed going badly. However, at some point, cabinet reshuffles and resignations will not suffice to deflect responsibility for decisions that have made it even worse.
The diversion is more significant than the article makes it out to be.
On face value, Kursk region isn’t that important to Moscow and they’ve got the strategic points like the nuclear plant on lock. However it’s hard to deny the value of the morale boost that Ukraine desperately needed, even as it has risks as with anything.
The choice for Ukraine is to keep on the defensive, slowly losing its ground, or the same thing happens but Putin is humiliated on the world stage by Ukraine, taking Russian military high command by surprise whether it forces their hand or not.
The Kursk incursion does not change losses caused by poor military coordination present from Ukrainian and Russian command structures.
There is zero chance of this incursion making it anywhere close to the nuclear plant. In fact, at this point even pro Ukrainian maps are showing that it’s Russia that’s on the offensive in Kursk. I also have no idea what morale boost you’re talking about as this stunt pulled valuable troops and machinery from the collapsing front in Donbas. Here’s what CNN reported just a couple of days ago https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/08/europe/ukraine-military-morale-desertion-intl-cmd/index.html
Two and half years of Russia’s grinding offensive have decimated many Ukrainian units. Reinforcements are few and far between, leaving some soldiers exhausted and demoralized. The situation is particularly dire among infantry units near Pokrovsk and elsewhere on the eastern front line, where Ukraine is struggling to stop Russia’s creeping advances.
As a battalion commander, Dima was in charge of around 800 men who fought in some of the fiercest, bloodiest battles of the war – most recently near Pokrovsk, the strategic eastern town that is now on the brink of falling to Russia.
But with most of his troops now dead or severely injured, Dima decided he’d had enough. He quit and took another job with the military – in an office in Kyiv.
Yury, a soldier attached to the 59th brigade based near Ukrainsk, says Ukrainian losses have been significant. A reinforcement of inexperienced infantrymen sent from Ukraine’s 71st brigade were wiped out. “Over three days, 100 became zero. Some ran, some fell.”
The Russians are still focused on control of the roads leading to Pokrovsk. “We have been fighting with our last guard, and have thrown our logistics guys into the trenches.”
“Physicist”, a tank commander with the 68th, says the Russian air force and artillery can react almost in real time; anything that moves and is not protected is destroyed. His tank drivers consequently now mostly work as static artillery units, operating from closed positions, and much farther back.
This also extended the front for Ukraine complicating their logistics situation. The worst part from Ukrainian perspective is that they can’t pull troops back because it will be admitting the failure of the gambit. So, now they’re stuck feeding men and machines into a battle that has zero long term value while they lose important strategic areas around Pokrovsk.
What’s likely to happen in the near future is that Ukraine will lose Pokrovsk which is a key logistics hub through which southern forces are supplied by rail. Once that’s lost there’s no good way to move supplies or reinforcements south meaning that the group of forces there will be completely cut off. Kursk greatly accelerated this process.
The Pokrovsk direction is a real threat for Ukraine, agreed, and also is a gambit wirh inherent risk, agreed. In your view, how much more likely would Ukraine be to fend off the Russian assault on that front had they not?
The direction of travel would’ve been the same, but Ukraine might’ve been able to hold the line for a few extra months. The key part here is that Kursk stunt has no upside to it, and it made an already catastrophic situation worse.
That said, the problem Ukraine had from the start was that it was entirely dependent on the west because it’s not able to produce its own weapons. As a result, Ukraine has to fight a war for western media which puts huge constraints on their strategy. For example, Ukraine always holds territory to the last man instead of withdrawing from untenable positions as they did with Bakhmut. I think that Kursk is another example of this phenomenon. Ukraine needed to demonstrate that they still have a capacity to fight, and hence they came up with a narrative that they’re able to bring the fight to Russia.
Conversely, Russian army has far more operational freedom because they’re not fighting for the media. They’re able to make strategic retreats as they did in 2022, and they can absorb incursions like Kursk without diverting troops from strategic areas. Because Russia is self sufficient in military terms, they can ignore whatever narratives are being spun at the time and focus on achieving their long term goals.
From my understanding the losses occurred mainly from miscommunications between one group sent in to relieve another, or drone and air units with jammer units and that kind of thing. Macroscopic strategy decisions such as the Kursk incursion are not related to that. Clearly it was planned well as intelligence kept it under wraps until its execution. The execution of the defense was poorer on the eastern front such as intergroup communication problems, inadequately prepared defense lines and so on.
The diversion is more significant than the article makes it out to be.
On face value, Kursk region isn’t that important to Moscow and they’ve got the strategic points like the nuclear plant on lock. However it’s hard to deny the value of the morale boost that Ukraine desperately needed, even as it has risks as with anything.
The choice for Ukraine is to keep on the defensive, slowly losing its ground, or the same thing happens but Putin is humiliated on the world stage by Ukraine, taking Russian military high command by surprise whether it forces their hand or not.
The Kursk incursion does not change losses caused by poor military coordination present from Ukrainian and Russian command structures.
There is zero chance of this incursion making it anywhere close to the nuclear plant. In fact, at this point even pro Ukrainian maps are showing that it’s Russia that’s on the offensive in Kursk. I also have no idea what morale boost you’re talking about as this stunt pulled valuable troops and machinery from the collapsing front in Donbas. Here’s what CNN reported just a couple of days ago https://www.cnn.com/2024/09/08/europe/ukraine-military-morale-desertion-intl-cmd/index.html
Here’s what The Economist reports https://archive.is/KrBmX
This has been a gift for Russia because now Ukrainian troops are out in the open where Ukraine is taking much heavier losses than they did while they were dug in. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/08/17/out-in-the-open-and-on-the-move-in-russias-kursk-oblast-ukrainian-forces-are-vulnerable-and-losing-lots-of-armored-vehicles/
This also extended the front for Ukraine complicating their logistics situation. The worst part from Ukrainian perspective is that they can’t pull troops back because it will be admitting the failure of the gambit. So, now they’re stuck feeding men and machines into a battle that has zero long term value while they lose important strategic areas around Pokrovsk.
What’s likely to happen in the near future is that Ukraine will lose Pokrovsk which is a key logistics hub through which southern forces are supplied by rail. Once that’s lost there’s no good way to move supplies or reinforcements south meaning that the group of forces there will be completely cut off. Kursk greatly accelerated this process.
The Pokrovsk direction is a real threat for Ukraine, agreed, and also is a gambit wirh inherent risk, agreed. In your view, how much more likely would Ukraine be to fend off the Russian assault on that front had they not?
The direction of travel would’ve been the same, but Ukraine might’ve been able to hold the line for a few extra months. The key part here is that Kursk stunt has no upside to it, and it made an already catastrophic situation worse.
That said, the problem Ukraine had from the start was that it was entirely dependent on the west because it’s not able to produce its own weapons. As a result, Ukraine has to fight a war for western media which puts huge constraints on their strategy. For example, Ukraine always holds territory to the last man instead of withdrawing from untenable positions as they did with Bakhmut. I think that Kursk is another example of this phenomenon. Ukraine needed to demonstrate that they still have a capacity to fight, and hence they came up with a narrative that they’re able to bring the fight to Russia.
Conversely, Russian army has far more operational freedom because they’re not fighting for the media. They’re able to make strategic retreats as they did in 2022, and they can absorb incursions like Kursk without diverting troops from strategic areas. Because Russia is self sufficient in military terms, they can ignore whatever narratives are being spun at the time and focus on achieving their long term goals.
That’s an interesting view for sure. Thanks for sharing.
deleted by creator
Yes it does that too.
From my understanding the losses occurred mainly from miscommunications between one group sent in to relieve another, or drone and air units with jammer units and that kind of thing. Macroscopic strategy decisions such as the Kursk incursion are not related to that. Clearly it was planned well as intelligence kept it under wraps until its execution. The execution of the defense was poorer on the eastern front such as intergroup communication problems, inadequately prepared defense lines and so on.