LibreWolf is a great privacy oriented Browser for desktop. But there is no version for android or IOS . There are some like mull but they have their own problems. Mobile phones stay with us most of the day. So we need extra privacy for it.

  • circuscriticEnglish
    42·
    3 months ago

    It means that one malicious site can compromise your entire phone.

      • circuscriticEnglish
        51·
        3 months ago

        Avoid Gecko-based browsers like Firefox as they’re currently much more vulnerable to exploitation and inherently add a huge amount of attack surface. Gecko doesn’t have a WebView implementation (GeckoView is not a WebView implementation), so it has to be used alongside the Chromium-based WebView rather than instead of Chromium, which means having the remote attack surface of two separate browser engines instead of only one. Firefox / Gecko also bypass or cripple a fair bit of the upstream and GrapheneOS hardening work for apps. Worst of all, Firefox does not have internal sandboxing on Android.

        https://grapheneos.org/usage#web-browsing

        That sounds like the exposed attack surface is a lot more than just whatever sites are running under your Firefox process.

        But what do I know, I’m not a developer of security-hardened Android forks, so I just have to pick which randos on the internet I choose to believe. When the developers of DivestOS and GrapheneOS both have lengthy write-ups on why chromium base browsers are significantly more secure, I’m going to believe them because I don’t have the low level technical knowledge to refute what they’re saying.

          • circuscriticEnglish
            4·
            3 months ago

            Right, so if Gecko based browsers can cause that kind of security concern on Graphene, what does that mean for people using Android ROMs that are not hardened, or, OEM variants that do not receive regular security updates?

            Any app installed by a user that takes advantage of an active and unpatched CVE, can do all sorts of actions to compromise an entire phone, or critical parts of it. Are you saying that’s not the case?

            The difference between a compromised app, and a browser, is that even a “safe” Firefox install is used to browse a near infinite possibility of websites, any number of which might be running an active campaign targeting unpatched Android vulnerabilities.

            It sounds like you’re saying that despite Firefox Geckos significantly larger attack surface, the fact that Chromium doesn’t eliminate all risk, means there’s no difference.

              • circuscriticEnglish
                4·
                3 months ago

                It’s like you’re arguing because you like to argue, and can’t admit that you’re wrong. So you keep finding new ways to qualify your response in the hopes that I forget what this is even about.

                Chromium is significantly more secure than Firefox Gecko on Android. That is according to the developers of probably the two most well regarded hardened Android ROMs.

                One of which, Graphene, even advises completely avoiding Gecko based browsers.

                Which is what I said in my original comment, well, the part about relative security.

                You’ve also claimed that at most, a malicious android application can only harm battery life and cause network issues, which is objectively false. I’m honestly kind of confused why you even said that, but whatever.

                I never said no one should use Firefox based browsers on Android, I just said they weren’t as secure and that user should understand the risks associated with them.

                But what I’m most confused and perplexed by, is your insistence that only high risk individuals should be concerned with using a browser that comes with, at minimum, double the attack service they’re exposed to when browsing the web.

                Again, that is per the GrapheneOS wiki/FAQ.

                I mean, we’re not talking about some hardcore and incredibly inconvenient levels of unnecessary OPSEC for the sake of OPSEC, we’re talking about a browser.

                Tell you what, if you post a link to your GitHub showing me the hardened Android ROM that you develop, or heavily contribute to, I would be happy to revise my opinion on your credibility versus those developers.

                  • circuscriticEnglish
                    3·
                    3 months ago

                    What if I told you I work in information security, and your not impressing me, or tripping me up, by using terms like defense in depth and attack chains, nor am I confused and unable see through your misrepresenting Graphene’s threat model to imply it only matters for high threat risk individuals.

                    Just because I said I don’t have enough low level understanding of Android development to refute those devs write-ups on Android browser security, doesn’t mean I’m coming here without a professionally informed understanding of security, and all the terms you keep throwing out to muddy the issue.

                    So, I’ll leave it there. I will take my professional knowledge and experiences, along with my judgment on which sources I incorporate into my broader understanding of this situation, and agree to disagree with your analysis and conclusions.