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Cake day: November 10th, 2025

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  • No, it has not turned around. It’s gotten even worse since.

    But there is no reason imho to repost things that old because we know this already. If we start posting things from last year because they didn’t get better we might soon have a lot of re-reads.

    In addition, I don’t see how this is related to Canada.

    It’s just another post in OP’s eternal propaganda mission. To give you an idea what I mean: China’s minority policy hasn’t turned around. Russia is still waging a war against Ukraine. Iran is still threatening protesters at home. Should we post all these here in the Canada community?

























  • As an addition: There are many excellent studies illustrating how China leverages its foreign investments across the globe exclusively to its own benefit at the cost of regional economies and their peoples.

    As one study from 2023, China as an International Lender of Last Resort (pdf), states,

    China’s rescue loans differ from those of established international lenders of last resort in that they (i) are opaque, (ii) carry relatively high interest rates, and (iii) are almost exclusively targeted to debtors of China’s Belt and Road Initiative … Chinese rescue lending is extended at relatively high interest rates. The [U.S.] Fed usually charges margins of around 25 basis points over the LIBOR reference rate. In contrast, the PBOC swap lines show interest rates at margins between 200 and 400 basis points above the Shibor reference rate, while the typical rescue loan by Chinese banks requires interest rates of 5 percent … These rates are also considerably higher than the average IMF interest rate, which has been around 2 percent for non-concessional lending operations over the past 10 years …

    In a more recent investigation, researchers showed how China uses collateralizes (pdf) to achieve its goals that. As the study says, Beijing’s practices,

    raise new concerns about debt transparency, fiscal management, fiscal autonomy, and the quality of macroeconomic surveillance, particularly in commodity-exporting EMDEs [emerging market and developing economies] … lending to EMDEs by Chinese creditors documents a heavy reliance on collateral unrelated to the stated purpose of the debt: loans secured by commodity revenues are not designed to generate more of these revenue … l lenders can manage subordination risk with so-called “negative pledge” clauses in their contracts, which usually require the debtor to forswear secured borrowing … Chinese lenders’ apparent preference for quasi-collateral means that their security interests are rarely recorded in public registries or collateral filing systems … These factors, combined with confidentiality clauses preventing disclosure, raise asymmetric information problems among creditors …

    Both studies complement a strong body of research regarding China’s malign lending practice which show similar patterns across all countries, including, of course, Africa.


  • he takes a unique stance against the big powers?

    Pedro Sanchez is apparently not interested in human rights. He contracted Spain’s judicial wiretapping system to Huawei from China, a country he considers an ‘ally,’ and its dictatorial government is not famous exactly for respecting the rule of law. And this is just one example that shows Sanchez’s character.

    Sanchez is doing what he thinks is helpful to his career and nothing else. This person is a shame for his country and entire Europe. He should have resigned long time ago.





  • In addition to other comments: Russia is definitely an energy exporting country, but Russian oil is sold ​at a discount mainly due to the Western sanctions over the war in Ukraine. This includes a price cap introduced by European Union that has been lowering the price to $44.10 per barrel since February 1. When the price for crude increased this weak to more than $80, Russia didn’t benefit.

    A calculation by Reuters also suggests that the situation will further strain Russia’s budget:

    State coffers have been drained ​by heavy defence and security spending since Russia began its military campaign in Ukraine in February 2022 … The price of Russia’s Urals oil basket would need to climb by more than 50% ‌from ⁠3,582 roubles ($46.13) per barrel , which was reached on March 2 in order to meet the budgeted levels.

    Russia’s budget for 2026 assumes an oil price of 5,440 roubles per barrel, or $59, and a rouble rate of 92.2 per U.S. dollar.

    Conversely, assuming stable oil prices, the rouble should weaken to ​117.5 per $1 for the budget ​to be balanced from ⁠around 77.65 currently.

    Kirill Tremasov, adviser to the [Russian] central bank governor, said on Saturday that the central bank did not expect the rouble to crumble, ​while the oil rally could be short-lived.